Zero day playbook: a 72-hour checklist for your role and the asset that was hit
The 72-hour clock
Hour 4 of 72, the 0 to 4 hours window is open. Executive facing a network edge appliance (VPN or firewall): 8 of 19 steps open or done.
- 0 to 4 hours: 8 steps
- 4 to 24 hours: 5 steps
- 24 to 72 hours: 6 steps
- Hours elapsed: the bar under the cells
0 to 4 hours8 steps, due by hour 4; open now
- 1
Fix hour zero in writing: the earlier of the time the vendor published the advisory and the time your team learned of it, with its time zone. Name the one person who can approve downtime and the one who can accept risk, and set the bridge cadence: every 4 hours until the security lead reports the fix verified on every in-scope asset, then daily.
Done at
- 2
Get the five-line brief from the security lead and use the same five lines for every later update. A filled example for the Palo Alto PAN-OS advisory of 14 Oct 2026, CVE-2026-0322 (the company figures are invented): Affected: 6 firewalls, 4 with the management interface reachable from the internet. Exploitation: confirmed by Palo Alto and listed by CISA on 14 Oct; no sign of access on our devices yet, log search unfinished. Done: management interfaces limited to the jump box. Open: 6 firewalls unpatched, Palo Alto lists no workaround and the jump box only limits who can reach the flaw, owner named, compromise search due 15 Oct 12:00. Next update: 15 Oct 08:00.
Done at
- 3
Approve emergency change authority in writing, with limits: the actions allowed without the change board (apply a mitigation, apply the fixed build, restart the service), the systems covered, the people who may act, and an expiry 72 hours after hour zero. Removal of a safeguard stays with the normal board.
Done at
- 4
Security lead, hand-off
List every appliance of the vendor, its model family and software version. PAN-OS (CVE-2026-0322): run show system info and read model and sw-version, or read Dashboard > General Information; check Panorama and each firewall it manages. SonicOS (CVE-2026-19868): read the firmware version in the management interface for every firewall of a pair and every NSv. Match each version to the vendor's fixed-build table for its own release train.
Done at
- 5
Security lead, hand-off
Check the exposure conditions the advisory names. PAN-OS CVE-2026-0322: read Device > Setup > Interfaces > Management Interface Settings > Permitted IP Addresses, and Network > Network Profiles > Interface Mgmt for any profile that allows HTTPS or SSH on a data-plane interface. Then test from a host outside your network, such as a cloud instance, with nmap -Pn -p 22,443 <management-address> and curl -sk -m 5 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://<management-address>/; any answer means the interface is reachable from the internet. SonicOS (CVE-2026-19868) has two preconditions. First, SAML is the login method for SSLVPN users: review the SSLVPN user authentication settings in the management interface. Second, at least one LDAP, RADIUS or TACACS+ server is active: open Device > Users > Settings > Authentication, then Configure RADIUS > Settings > RADIUS Servers, Configure LDAP > Settings > LDAP Servers and Configure TACACS+ > Settings > TACACS+ Servers; any server listed and not disabled counts. If either half fails, the bypass does not apply to that firewall. The attacker also needs valid credentials for one of those alternate methods, so list who holds accounts in those directories and confirm whether the SSLVPN portal answers from an untrusted network.
Done at
- 6
Platform engineering, hand-off
Cut reachability before the patch. For PAN-OS, set Permitted IP Addresses to one jump box, which is the only system allowed to reach the management interface. For SSLVPN flaws, restrict the portal to known source ranges only if remote staff can work without it. Test from an untrusted network that the management address no longer answers.
Done at
- 7
Security lead, hand-off
Pull forensic evidence before any upgrade. On PAN-OS export device state (Device > Setup > Operations > Export device state) and save System, Config and Authentication logs from Monitor > Logs. Save the configuration audit and the administrator list (Device > Administrators). Send logs to storage the appliance cannot write to.
Done at
- 8
Security lead, hand-off
Search the exported logs and the firewall traffic logs for the indicator addresses the vendor published. For CVE-2026-0322 these are 66[.]42[.]72[.]14, 208[.]83[.]239[.]114 and 149[.]248[.]47[.]234. Palo Alto published no file or log signatures, so also list every administrator login to the management interface in the exposure window and check each against a person.
Done at
- 1
4 to 24 hours5 steps, due by hour 24; opens after hour 4
- 9
Decide on downtime with three facts from the security lead: whether exploitation is confirmed, whether an unauthenticated network path exists, and whether a mitigation limits the reachable set to trusted networks. Ask the business owner for two numbers: cost per hour offline and the manual process that runs meanwhile. Then choose one: keep running behind the mitigation, run a reduced service, or take it offline until the fix is verified.
Done at
- 10
Ask counsel two questions in writing: which notification clocks apply to us if a compromise is found, and who makes the materiality determination if we are a US registrant. SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 is due "within four business days after the registrant determines that it has experienced a material cybersecurity incident," and the determination "must be made without unreasonable delay after discovery of the incident." Put the determination meeting in the calendar with a time. The deadlines for each regime are on the communications playbook.
Done at
- 11
Send the board brief 24 hours after hour zero, sooner if exploitation is confirmed on your own systems. It holds the five lines, the decisions taken with the time of each, the decisions that need the board, and what is unknown. Use dates and times, not words like recently.
Done at
- 12
Platform engineering, hand-off
Upgrade to the fixed build for the train, in a window within the day. PAN-OS (CVE-2026-0322), by release train: 12.2 to 12.2.4; 12.1 to 12.1.4-h12, 12.1.7-h8 or 12.1.10-h2; 11.2 to 11.2.4-h22, 11.2.7-h21, 11.2.10-h15, 11.2.13-h3 or 11.2.16; 11.1 to 11.1.4-h37, 11.1.6-h39, 11.1.7-h11, 11.1.10-h35, 11.1.13-h15 or 11.1.16-h3; 10.2 to 10.2.7-h38, 10.2.10-h41, 10.2.13-h26, 10.2.16-h11 or 10.2.18-h12 (each or later in its sub-train, per Palo Alto). SonicOS (CVE-2026-19868): Gen7 to 7.3.4-7013 or higher, Gen8 to 8.2.3-8015 or higher. In an HA pair, suspend the passive node, upgrade and verify it, fail over, then upgrade the other, and take a configuration backup first. On PAN-OS run show system info after each node and confirm sw-version equals the fixed build.
Done at
- 13
Platform engineering, hand-off
For devices you cannot upgrade today, keep the reachability cut in place and apply the vendor's partial coverage if it exists. PAN-OS (CVE-2026-0322): Threat IDs 510046 and 510047 (content version 9159-10287 or later) need management traffic routed through a data-plane interface with decryption and threat prevention; treat them as partial cover only. SonicOS (CVE-2026-19868): the workaround is to disable the LDAP, RADIUS and TACACS+ servers, which removes the alternate login method the bypass needs; use it only where no one needs those servers.
Done at
- 9
24 to 72 hours6 steps, due by hour 72; opens after hour 24
- 14
Review each risk acceptance as a signed record. Template, copy and fill: Asset: ____. Exposure (who can reach it, from where): ____. Flaw (CVE, authentication needed, impact): ____. Compensating control in place and tested on: ____. Reason it cannot be fixed now: ____. Owner: ____. Approver: ____. Expiry (date and hour): ____. Reject any acceptance for an unauthenticated flaw with total control and no compensating control. Set the expiry of an internet-reachable asset at 7 days or less, since 24 of the 33 dated bugs in the Disclosure Clock were exploited within that time.
Done at
- 15
Ask for evidence, not status: the version output from the running service on each asset, and the security lead's triage outcome, one of CISA's three: no evidence of compromise, compromise suspected, compromise confirmed. Do not accept a change ticket as proof of a fix. If the outcome is suspected or confirmed, move the incident to the full incident response plan and call counsel the same hour.
Done at
- 16
Call the 72-hour review and assign each action item an owner and a date. Decide what to pre-approve for next time (emergency authority, a standing downtime rule), which end-of-life products to retire, and what to budget. Close with the hour-zero to verified-fix time as the number the board sees.
Done at
- 17
Security lead, hand-off
PAN-OS (CVE-2026-0322): hunt for persistence on every device that was reachable before the cut. Open Device > Config Audit and compare the running configuration with the last backup taken before the device was first reachable from an untrusted network, not the 14 Oct 2026 disclosure date, because exploitation can predate an advisory; with no such backup, use the oldest one you hold and treat each difference as unexplained until a person owns it. Open Device > Administrators and match every account and role to a person. Read Monitor > Logs > Configuration and System for administrator logins, and for changes made by accounts nobody can explain. Check Device > Certificate Management > Certificates for certificates you did not install, and Device > Server Profiles and Device > Authentication Profile for changed RADIUS, LDAP or SAML servers. Check Network > Virtual Routers and Policies for routes, NAT and rules added since that last clean backup. Because the flaw runs code as root, a device with any unexplained change is rebuilt, not cleaned. SonicOS (CVE-2026-19868): compare SSLVPN login records with the SAML provider's sign-in log: a user on the firewall with no matching SAML sign-in came in through the alternate method. SonicWall names no log event for this bypass, so export the SSLVPN login events from the firewall event log or the syslog server for the exposure window into firewall-sslvpn-users.txt (one username per line) and the SAML sign-ins for the same window from the identity provider into idp-saml-signins.txt, then run comm -23 <(sort -u firewall-sslvpn-users.txt) <(sort -u idp-saml-signins.txt). Every name it prints logged into SSLVPN without a SAML sign-in and gets an owner's explanation, or its credentials are rotated and its sessions ended.
Done at
- 18
Platform engineering, hand-off
If any device was reachable and cannot be cleared, rotate what it holds: administrator and service passwords, LDAP and RADIUS bind credentials, VPN pre-shared keys, SAML signing and device certificates, and force all VPN sessions to end.
Done at
- 19
Security lead, hand-off
Rescan from outside the network for the vulnerable version banner and the management port, and confirm each device meets its fixed build. Close the temporary jump-box rule only when the owner agrees, and keep it if no one needs the management interface from elsewhere.
Done at
- 14
What the checklist is built from, and how it changes
The checklist merges the role playbook with the asset playbook you pick, starting on the executive and network edge appliance playbooks. Each vendor step rests on the advisory for the CVE it names. The board brief example uses invented company figures. The sources are listed below, each with the day it was read, 19 Nov 2026.
The hour slider opens a window once the hours elapsed pass the end of the one before: at hour 4 only the 0 to 4 hours window is open, and the 4 to 24 hours window shows from hour 5. Role and asset choices change the steps, commands and fixed builds; there are 17 playbooks to choose from.
When the vendor has no fixed build
Some advisories list no fixed build for your release line, or none yet. Then the steps above that need a patch cannot close the work, and three things take their place. Isolate: take the device off the internet when its interface is reachable from untrusted networks and exploitation is reported. Compensate: keep the reachability cut, apply any partial vendor cover, and test both from outside. Set the review clock: the executive names one owner and a review time, 24 hours at most, and reviews daily once exploitation is confirmed. Record the three in a signed risk acceptance, step 14, and move to the fixed build the day the vendor ships it.
A worked case: SonicOS CVE-2026-19868
One real case, SonicOS CVE-2026-19868, hour by hour from the dated events in the sources. Hour 0 is 00:00 UTC on 5 Nov 2026, the start of the day SonicWall dated advisory SNWLID-2026-0014 version 1.0 (the revision history gives a date, not a time; the Disclosure Clock uses the same date). SonicWall gives no date for the first attack and no indicators. The Disclosure Clock dates first exploitation at 6 Nov 2026, the day NVD published the record and CISA listed the flaw as exploited, so that date is a catalog date, not an attack date. Three events fall inside the 72 hours and one after it: the 9 Nov revision, between hour 96 and hour 120 because it carries only a date.
- Hour 0 to 24, 5 Nov: version 1.0 is released with Gen7 fixed at 7.3.4-7013 and Gen8 at 8.2.3-8015. The team works steps 1, 4 and 5.
- Hour 34, 10:40 UTC on 6 Nov: the PSIRT data stamps the advisory as published. The team works steps 6 and 7.
- Hour 43, 19:17 UTC on 6 Nov: NVD publishes the record, and CISA adds the flaw to its catalog the same day (listing time not given, so between hour 24 and hour 48) with a due date of 20 Nov and exploitation marked active. The team works steps 12 and 13 and rescans from outside before hour 72.
- Hour 96 to 120, 9 Nov: version 1.1 gives the workaround as disabling every LDAP, RADIUS and TACACS+ server, which stops anything that signs in through them. The team, past its 72-hour report, rechecks each device still on the workaround and works steps 17 and 18.
Every playbook, by role and by asset type
- 0 to 4 hours
- 4 to 24 hours
- 24 to 72 hours
The three blocks beside each name count its steps per window.
By role
- Communications022
- Executive211
By asset type
- Endpoint fleet322
- Dependency333
- Network edge appliance (VPN or firewall)323
- Cisco ISE network access control242
- Container base image342
- SaaS vendor043
- Email gateway022
- Remote support tool432
- Artifact repository143
- CMS and storefront023
- Windows operating system332
- Linux server (SSH)224
- AI infrastructure243
- Developer collaboration platform332
- Application runtime333
17 playbooks. Each page holds its steps as a table, the 72 cells for its windows and a checklist to print.
The Disclosure Clock in the same 72 cells
Of the 33 headline bugs of 2026 with a dated first exploitation, the count moves only four times inside the 72 hours. The hour 24, 48 and 72 counts come from whole-day gaps between disclosure and first exploitation (1, 2 and 3 days or fewer), not from times of day. The median gap is 2 days.
- 12 of 33On or before disclosure day
- 16 of 33By hour 24
- 18 of 33By hour 48
- 19 of 33By hour 72
One row per dated bug, CC BY 4.0: clock.csv clock.json
Sources
9 sources, each with its read date
- CISA BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA BOD 26-04 Implementation Guidance, forensic triage steps, read 19 Nov 2026
- SEC final rule, Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, 88 FR 51896 (4 Aug 2023), Form 8-K Item 1.05, read 19 Nov 2026
- Palo Alto Networks advisory CVE-2026-0322, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-0322, read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-0322, read 19 Nov 2026
- SonicWall advisory SNWLID-2026-0014 (CVE-2026-19868), read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-19868, read 19 Nov 2026
- The Disclosure Clock data file, zerodayplaybook.com (33 bugs with a dated first exploitation), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.